Icons, Magnitudes, and Their Parts

Main Article Content

Corey J. Maley
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6221-3181

Abstract

Analog representations come in different types. One distinction is between those representations that have parts that are themselves representations and those that do not (i.e., those for which the Parts Principle is true and those for which it is not). I offer a unified account of analog representation, showing what all types have in common. This account clarifies when the Parts Principle applies and when it does not, thereby illuminating why the Parts Principle is less interesting than one might have thought. Understanding analog representation instead requires understanding the kinds of magnitudes used in a particular representation, and the kinds of variation possible within a representational scheme.

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How to Cite
Maley, C. J. (2023). Icons, Magnitudes, and Their Parts. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía, 55(163), 129–154. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1411

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